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All over the world, declining population growth rates and rising life expec-
tancy are creating problems for public retirement systems. With a constant
population structure, a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security system
could operate at constant tax and replacement rates. But, when the ratio
of retirees to workers rises, either tax rates must be raised, or the replace-
ment rate must be reduced. These demographic changes are the driving
force behind the current social security reform debate.
This paper considers the design of social security from an ex ante per-
spective. Once a demographic shock is realized, a debate on how to adjust
taxes and beneﬁts is necessarily a distributional debate. A lighter burden
on one generation implies a heavier burden on other generations. From
an ex ante perspective, in contrast, demographics is a stochastic process,
and the design questions are about risk sharing. Diﬀerent realizations of
birthrates and survival rates have an eﬀect on the ﬁnancial status of gov-
ernment programs and, more broadly, on the set of feasible allocations of
national resources. Policy questions are then questions of eﬃciency: How
can the ﬁnancial risks created by demographic uncertainty be shared by
diﬀerent generations? What are the risk-sharing implications of alterna-
tive policy rules? Moreover, we can evaluate speciﬁc policy actions (“re-
forms”) taken in response to demographic changes in terms of whether
they represent eﬃcient responses to the underlying shocks.
I examine demographic changes in a Diamond (1965)-style neoclassical
growth model with overlapping generations, building on Bohn (1998).
Government policy is potentially welfare improving because future gener-
ations are naturally excluded from ﬁnancial markets. They cannot insure
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203themselves against macroeconomic or demographic risks.1 In this setting,
I characterize the general properties of alternative social security systems,
with a focus on four speciﬁc alternatives: a PAYGO social security system
with deﬁned beneﬁts (DB); a PAYGO system with deﬁned contributions
(DC);aprivate/privatizedsystem;anda“conditionallyprefunded”system.
The two PAYGO systems are relevant because existing social security
systems in many developed countries, including the United States until
1983, are pure PAYGO systems. If the worker-retiree ratio is constant, DB
and DC are observationally equivalent. But, when the retiree-worker ratio
rises, the key issue for PAYGO social security is whether taxes are held con-
stant and beneﬁts reduced or whether beneﬁts are held constant and taxes
increased. This choice is at the heart of the current U.S. policy debate.
The analysis of a privatized system is motivated by the current discus-
sion about systems in which individuals fund their own retirement, at least
inpart.Afullyprivatizedsystemrepresentsthispolicyoptioninpureform.2
Finally, the “conditionally prefunded” social security system is intended
to capture key features of the post-1983 U.S. system. The U.S. social secu-
rity debate is heavily inﬂuenced by the Social Security Administration’s
seventy-ﬁve-year extrapolations of current policy. Whenever the seventy-
ﬁve-year forecast shows a signiﬁcant revenue gap, public pressure seems
to arise to reform the system.3 If one takes this linkage seriously and as-
sumes that projected funding gaps systematically trigger tax and beneﬁt
changes, one obtains a well-deﬁned pattern of intergenerational transfers,
namely, a system in which trust funds are accumulated or drawn down in
response to demographic shocks. For the stylized representation of such a
system, I assume that net beneﬁts are ﬁxed one generational period in
advance, at a level that depends negatively on anticipated changes in the
retiree-worker ratio.4
The paper derives four main sets of results, namely, about the implica-
tions of variable birthrates, about variations in longevity, about the diﬀer-
ent positive eﬀects of alternative policies, and about their eﬃciency prop-
erties.
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1. To simplify, I abstract from private risk sharing and from Ricardian bequests.
2. Some of the privatization literature distinguishes between private savings without gov-
ernment intervention and “privatized” social security, meaning a funded system that is man-
datory and government regulated. For the intergenerational issues discussed in this paper,
this distinction is irrelevant.
3. For example, the 1983 reform was supposed to cover the then-existing revenue gap
through tax increases that would accumulate a trust fund suﬃcient to carry social security
through the years of baby-boom retirement. Much of the current debate is also about closing
the projected funding gap.
4. There is an apparent consensus that beneﬁt changes ought to be phased in slowly and
that the beneﬁts of current retirees cannot be touched. The reform debate is about varying
future beneﬁt levels in response to anticipated demographic pressures, not about moving to
a true PAYGO-DC system with variable beneﬁts to current retirees. McHale (chap. 7 this
volume) suggests that social security reforms in other countries follow a similar pattern.First, members of a small cohort generally beneﬁt from being in a small
cohort even if the government operates a DB social security system. This
ﬁnding deserves emphasis because the main concern in the current reform
debate has been about the plight of the baby-bust generation, about the
fact that DB imposes relatively high taxes on small cohorts that support
preceding larger cohorts. Large cohorts are, however, worse oﬀ than small
ones if there is no DB social security: their high labor supply drives down
the wage rate when the cohort is young; their desire to save reduces the
return on capital as they age. Conversely, small cohorts enjoy favorable
factor-price movements. They are better oﬀ than large cohorts even with
a DB social security system unless taxes are so high that the ﬁscal burden
dominates the factor-price eﬀects.
Inthemodel,themagnitudeofthefactor-priceeﬀectsrelativetotheﬁscal
burden depends on the elasticity of factor substitution and on the level of
social security taxes. With Cobb-Douglas technology (as the benchmark),
the factor-price eﬀects dominate if the ratio of tax rate () to one minus
the tax rate, /(1), is below the capital share in output. For the United
States, this condition is satisﬁed by a wide margin, suggesting that the
factor-price eﬀects of birthrate changes should dominate the ﬁscal eﬀects.
The current debate about social security reform, in contrast, focuses on
ﬁscal pressures and virtually ignores factor-price eﬀects.5
One may wonder, of course, to what extent the results from the two-
period model are empirically realistic. The empirical evidence is unfortu-
nately very limited, largely because it takes decades of data to obtain a
single generation-length observation. Empirical evidence in related ar-
eas—cross-country growth and studies of relative wages—suggests, how-
ever, that demographic changes have wage eﬀects broadly consistent with
the overlapping-generations model (see sec. 6.5 below).
The second set of results is about unexpected changes in old-age mortal-
ity. The implications for the allocation of risk depend signiﬁcantly on the
individual predictability of death, on the availability of fair annuities, and
on who might receive any accidental bequests. Under a variety of assump-
tions, lower old-age mortality increases the need for retirement consump-
tion. The eﬃcient response to a longer retirement period is then to in-
crease social security beneﬁts. This argument applies if deaths are
individually foreseeable, or if savings are annuitized so that accidental be-
quests are small, or if accidental bequests are distributed within a cohort.
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5. The Social Security Administration’s long-run projections of the social security system’s
ﬁnancial status are, e.g., based on extrapolating historical trends. Neither the linkage be-
tween cohort size and factor prices nor the insurance role of DB social security is a new
idea. Easterlin (1987) provides much broader arguments about the advantages of being in a
small cohort. Smith (1982) provides a numerical example illustrating the insurance role of
DB social security. The point here is that the factor-price eﬀects are large relative to the ﬁscal
eﬀects under empirically plausible assumptions and therefore important for social security
reform.Reduced beneﬁts might be eﬃcient, however, if lower old-age mortality
reduces the accidental bequests received by workers.6
Third, a comparison of alternative policies shows that a fully privatized
system has essentially the same risk-sharing properties as a DC PAYGO
system. This is because neither a DC PAYGO nor a privatized system
imposes higher taxes on the young when the retiree-worker ratio rises,
whereas a DB system does. For risk-sharing purposes, a partially privat-
ized system (say, combining a smaller DC plan with individual accounts)
is therefore equivalent to a mixture of DB and DC systems. A condition-
ally funded DB system mimics a partially privatized system with regard
to anticipated demographic changes, but it behaves like a pure DB system
when unexpected changes occur.
Fourth, none of the above systems is fully eﬃcient. Eﬃcient policy re-
sponses (if any) should take place as soon as a demographic shock is re-
vealed. Moreover, eﬃciency requires that all risks are shared by all gener-
ations, making no exception for current retirees. This requirement is
violated by DB and DC systems because both fail to vary current retiree
beneﬁts in anticipation of future changes in the retiree-worker ratio, for
example, when the current birthrate changes. I have argued elsewhere
(Bohn 1999b) that the political viability of social security requires at least
a one-period-ahead commitment to retiree beneﬁts (see also McHale,
chap. 7 in this volume). This may explain why the political debate takes
for granted that current retirees are exempt from reforms. From a risk-
sharing perspective, such an exemption is nonetheless a glaring ineﬃ-
ciency.
Although this paper focuses on demographic risks, I should brieﬂy com-
ment on other sources of uncertainty, notably on productivity risk and
stock market risk.7 Productivity shocks are arguably the most important
source of long-run uncertainty about wages and capital income (Bohn
1999a). In an overlapping-generations setting, productivity risk is not nec-
essarily allocated eﬃciently across cohorts. Policy tools such as govern-
ment debt and social security implicitly shift risk across cohorts (Bohn
1998). Social security, especially a wage-indexed system, has an important
role in this context because it provides a means of intergenerational redis-
tribution that is more “neutral” with regard to risk shifting than govern-
ment debt.
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6. In the current reform debate, increased longevity is often cited to justify an increased
“normal” retirement age, i.e., reduced beneﬁts for a given retirement age. Some proposals
even call for an indexing of the retirement age to life expectancy. The eﬃciency considera-
tions of this paper provide support for such proposals only if the accidental bequest channel
is empirically important. This is an open question.
7. There is also a huge literature on how social security helps share individual-level risks
such as disability, mortality, and cross-sectional income uncertainty (see, e.g., Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron 1999). Such risks may well be responsible for the existence and popularity
of social security, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.Stock market risk has recently received considerable attention in the
social security literature. Here, one should distinguish work on “privat-
ized” retirement (investment options in “individual accounts”) from work
on intergenerational risk sharing through the social security trust fund.
Individual accounts are essentially irrelevant from a generational perspec-
tive because the returns accrue to the contributors (Bohn 1997). Trust
fund investments, on the other hand, reallocate risk across generations
because future taxpayers are the residual claimants in any DB system.
Bohn (1997, 1999a), Smetters (1997, chap. 3 in this volume), Shiller
(1999), and Abel (1998, chap. 5 in this volume) discuss some of the posi-
tive and normative implications of alternative trust fund investments. This
paper abstracts from most ﬁnancial market issues to focus on demograph-
ics. But I include a simple productivity shock to demonstrate that shocks
to the labor force have very diﬀerent welfare implications than productiv-
ity shocks even though both have the same eﬀect on the eﬀective capital-
labor ratio. The productivity shock also illustrates how easily other shocks
could be added.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 6.1 describes the model. Sec-
tion 6.2 examines the risk-sharing implications of alternative social secu-
rity policies. Section 6.3 studies the implications of missing annuities mar-
kets and of accidental bequests. Section 6.4 derives necessary conditions
for eﬃcient risk sharing and their implications for social security policy.
Section 6.5 comments on extensions of the model and on empirical issues.
Section 6.6 concludes.
6.1 A Model with Stochastic Population Growth
This section examines risk sharing in a modiﬁed Diamond (1965)-style
overlapping-generations model with stochastic population growth and
stochastic total factor productivity.
6.1.1 Population Dynamics and Preferences
In the Diamond model, generation t enters as working-age adults in
period t and retires in period t  1. For modeling demographic uncer-
tainty, it is important, however, that individuals are born long before they
enter the labor force. In terms of generational time units, society has about
one period advance notice about changes in the retiree-worker ratio.
Hence, I will assume that generation t is born in period t  1, works in
period t, and retires in period t  1. At time t, NC
t is the number of genera-
tion t  1 children, NW
t the number of generation t workers, and NR
t the
number of generation t  1 retirees.
To limit the scope of the paper, I assume throughout that childbearing
is exogenous. Each of the NW
t workers of generation t has bt children so
that NC
t  NW
t  bt. To make the future workforce somewhat unpredictable,
Social Security and Demographic Uncertainty 207I assume that only a fraction 	1t1 of children survives into adulthood.8
Then the growth rate of the workforce, NW
t1/NW
t 	 1t1  NC
t /NW
t 	 1t1
 bt  1  nW
t1, is partially predictable, but not perfectly. The variables 	1t
(survival rate) and bt (birthrate) are assumed independently and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.). Throughout, individuals in a cohort are identical,
individual survival probabilities equal the aggregate survival rate, and all
variables are treated as continuous, including bt.
Parents care about their children’s consumption when the children live
in their household. Their preferences do not include an altruistic bequest
motive, however. This assumption is important because ﬁscal policy would
be irrelevant if all generations were linked through Ricardian bequests.
Since Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoﬀ (1996) ﬁnd that private intergener-
ational risk sharing is highly imperfect empirically, it is a reasonable as-
sumption in this context. Bequests may nonetheless occur “accidentally”
if mortality is stochastic and annuity markets are imperfect, as I will ex-
plain below.
Parents make decisions about their own consumption cW
t and about
their childrens’ consumption c0
t (per child). Throughout, I assume homo-
thetic (constant relative risk aversion [CRRA]) preferences to obtain bal-
anced growth. Let
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be the parent’s period t utility, where 0 is the inverse elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. The per child weight 0(bt) may depend on the
number of children: it seems reasonable to assume that 0  0(bt)  W
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t would be known at time t. One may also interpret 	1t1 as re-
ﬂecting uncertainty about immigration. But, since immigration would raise subtle welfare
questions (how to include immigrants in the welfare function), I will not address immigration
explicitly, and I interpret all uncertainty about NW
t1 as survival uncertainty.depends on the number of children. Under the assumptions outlined
above, the elasticity of the weight l with respect to the birthrate, 
  1/
bt  (bt/1), is in the interval 0 
   .
Overall, children matter for the analysis for two reasons. Their birth
provides advance notice about the size of future adult cohorts, and they
aﬀect their parents’ spending needs. Thus, the model accounts not only
for old-age dependency but also for variations in youth dependency. Oth-
erwise, the model with children works just like Diamond’s two-period
overlapping-generations model.
Now consider retirement. As old-age survival improves, more workers
survive into the retirement period, and those who survive live longer. For
social security, these changes matter only through their combined eﬀect
on the ratio of retirees to workers.9 For individual behavior, however, an
anticipated longer life span may have diﬀerent implications than a reduced
probability of a sudden death. For a known life span, retiree consumption
needs are presumably proportional to the length of the retirement period.
Retiree consumption needs will also increase if the rate of unanticipated
deaths declines in a setting with fair annuities. This is because individuals
withoutabequestmotivewillplacealltheirassetsintoannuities.Thereturn
on fair annuities is inversely related to the average survival rate. A rising
survival rate will therefore require more savings to support a given con-
sumption level, as in the case of a longer life span. If annuities are unavail-
able, however, or too expensive to be commonly used, a rising survival
rate increases the probability that retirees consume their assets and do
not leave accidental bequests. The cases with and without annuities have
diﬀerent policy implications and therefore deserve to be modeled carefully.
To capture a variable life expectancy in the overlapping-generations set-
ting, I model the retirement period as a fractional period. At the start of
period t, a fraction 1 	 2t of all generation t  1 workers dies. The re-
mainder, 	2t, learn that they will live for a period of length t  (0, 1].
Both the survival probability and the conditional length of life have pre-
dictable and unanticipated components: 	2t 	 e
2t1 	 u





t are i.i.d. shocks revealed at the start of period t, and
	e
2t1 and e
t1 are i.i.d. shocks revealed in period t  1.10 The product
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9. The two changes may have diﬀerent eﬀects if the social security replacement rate varies
with age or if one accounts for Medicare. In the United States, social security is ﬁxed in real
terms at retirement so that the replacement rate tends to fall with age, but the value of
Medicare is rising with age. In the model, the replacement rate is assumed constant within
each generational period.
10. For simplicity, I treat t and 	2t as level-stationary even though technical progress
in medical technology suggests an upward drift. Drift terms would require an analysis of
“unbalanced” growth paths. This could be done (for a deterministic analysis, see Bohn
1999b), but it would be cumbersome and would not provide new insights about risk sharing.
Autocorrelation could also be accommodated, but it would not aﬀect the main results and
is therefore omitted.	e
2t1  e
t1 may be interpreted as the life expectancy at retirement. Condi-
tional on survival, the period t utility of the old is assumed proportional
to the length of life, u2
t1  t  (c2
t1)1/(1  ).11
Finally, generation t’s overall preferences combine the utility over
working-age consumption u1
t(c1
t) and retirement consumption u2
t1(c2
t1):
(1) UIu c I u c
Ib c I c
tt t t t t t
tt t t t t
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where the random variables I1t and I2t1 are 0-1 indicators for individual
survival into adulthood and retirement, and 2 captures time preference.
In expectation, E[I1t]  E[	1t] 	 1 and Et[t1  I2t1] e
t 	 e
2t are equal
to the respective aggregate values.
Overall, the population dynamics are such that the future labor force
and the future worker-retiree ratio are quite predictable one period ahead,
but not perfectly. This limited predictability is important for modeling so-
cial security because it motivates why policy reforms are debated with
some lead time before demographic changes actually take place.
6.1.2 The Macroeconomic Setting
The macroeconomic setting is intentionally kept simple to focus on the
demographics. Each working-age person inelastically supplies one unit of
labor. Output is produced with capital Kt and labor NW
t :
(2) YK A N tt t t
W =⋅⋅
−  () ,
1
where  is the capital share, and At is the economy’s total factor productiv-
ity. Productivity follows a stochastic trend At  (1  at)  At1 with i.i.d.
growth rate at. Capital depreciates at the rate , implying a national re-
source constraint




t +−⋅ =⋅ +⋅⋅ ⋅ + −+ () . 1
12
211  	
Some extensions are examined in section 6.5.12
The wage rate wt  (1  )  At  [Kt/(At  NW
t )]  and the return on
capital Rk
t [Kt/(At  NW
t )] 1  (1  ) both depend on the capital-
labor ratio. Since Kt is known in period t  1, it is convenient to deﬁne
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11. One may interpret u2
t as an indirect utility obtained by maximizing ∫t
0 [c(s)] 1/
(1  )ds over a continuous consumption stream c(s), subject to a resource constraint lim-
iting ∫t
0 c(s)ds. Implicitly, this abstracts from within-period interest and discounting.
12. Bohn (1998) has shown how this setting can be generalized, e.g., to include a variable
labor supply, temporary productivity, government spending, and a production function with
an elasticity of substitution diﬀerent from one, but such complicating features would be
distracting here.the state variable kt1  Kt/(At1  NW
t1) that scales the capital stock by
lagged productivity and the lagged labor force. Wages and interest rates
then depend on kt1, on current productivity growth, and on the current
workforce growth.
To model policy, I abstract from all government activity but social secu-
rity.13 The government collects payroll taxes on wages wt a tar a t et from
all workers and pays beneﬁts to retirees at a replacement rate t. The cost
of social security is the product of the number of surviving retirees NR
t 
	2t  NW
t1, their length of life t, and the level of beneﬁt t  wt. The system’s
revenues are t  wt  NW
t . For given replacement rate t, the PAYGO budget
constraint therefore implies a payroll-tax rate of





















The ratio (t 	 2t)/(bt1 	 1t) can be interpreted as the “average” retiree-
worker ratio (after smoothing over t).
Interesting special cases of the PAYGO system are the deﬁned-beneﬁt
(DB) system with t * and the deﬁned-contribution (DC) system with
t * and t  (1 nW
t )/(t 	 2t) *. Since individuals are not liquid-
ity constrained, government-mandated savings (sometimes called privat-
ized or individual accounts systems) would simply reduce private savings
(Bohn 1997). A privatized social security system is therefore equivalent
to *  0. In a mixed system consisting of individual accounts plus a
PAYGO component, one should interpret t and t as the taxes and bene-
ﬁts of the PAYGO component.
A system with government-run trust funds is somewhat more compli-
cated if the system promises beneﬁts that do not depend on the perfor-
mance of the trust fund (as in the United States). Generational accounting
implies that each cohort’s net beneﬁts are equal to the system’s PAYGO
component, that is, to the statutory beneﬁts minus the proceeds from the
trust fund built up by the same cohort’s payroll taxes (see Bohn 1997). In
the United States, the buildup of the current trust fund started in 1983 in
response to a funding gap in the Social Security Administration’s long-run
projections. Projected funding gaps are similarly inﬂuencing the current
debate. Such gaps arise from two principal sources, rising life expectancy
and reduced birthrates. Hence, one may interpret the current U.S. system
as a deﬁned-beneﬁts system that accumulates trust funds in response to
either a rise in life expectancy, 	e
2t  e
t, or a fall in the birthrate, bt. Since
a trust fund buildup is equivalent to a reduction in net beneﬁts, such a
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13. This approach is nonetheless quite general because government transfers matter only
through diﬀerent cohorts’ generational accounts. Hence, social security can be interpreted
broadly as a stand-in for other intergenerational transfers.“conditionally prefunded” system can be represented parsimoniously by
a beneﬁt function t  (	e
2t, e
t, bt) with ∂/∂	e
2  0, ∂/∂e  0, and
∂/∂b  0.
McHale’s (chap. 7 in this volume) analysis of recent pension reforms
around the world suggests that a variable-beneﬁt function of this type is
empirically realistic for other countries, too. In the countries studied by
McHale, reforms were generally triggered by anticipated funding gaps.
Beneﬁts to current retirees remained virtually unchanged, but beneﬁts to
future generations were reduced. This implies a beneﬁt function with the
same features as in the conditionally prefunded system.
More generally, a variety of social security systems with and without
prefunding can be reinterpreted as PAYGO systems with an appropriately
state-contingent beneﬁt function. Hence, I will use the PAYGO notation
throughout the paper.
6.1.3 Individual Behavior
Individuals maximize their expected utility (1) subject to their budget
constraints. The main complications are potential imperfections in the
market for private annuities.
When working, individuals earn an after-tax wage income wt  (1  t)
and possibly receive accidental bequests Q1
t (deﬁned below). Denoting
savings by st, the ﬁrst-period budget equation is
(5) cw Qs tt t t t
11 1 =⋅− + − () . 
If fair annuities exist, they oﬀer a return Rk
t1/	2t1 that is above the return
on nonannuitized savings.14 Hence, all savings should be annuitized. Em-
pirically, however, private annuities are so costly that the bulk of private
savings is not annuitized (Congressional Budget Oﬃce 1998).
To gauge the signiﬁcance of this apparent market imperfection, ﬁrst
consider the case with fair annuities.15 If all assets are annuitized, surviving
retirees will spend their private resources Rk
t1/	2t1  st at the rate 1/t1,
and there are no bequests. Retirement consumption (including receipts
from social security) is then
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14. Either one may assume that individual annuity payoﬀs are indexed to the ex post
survival rate 	2t1; or, if annuity contracts promise a payoﬀ Rk
t1/	e
2t linked to the expected
survival rate, one may note that annuity ﬁrms, like all other ﬁrms, are owned by the old so
that the annuity ﬁrms’ aggregate proﬁt Rk
t1 	 2t  Rk
t1/	e
2t accrues to the old. In either
case, the old bear the risk of unexpected mortality changes.
15. Ideally, one might want to include a model of why private annuities are so costly (e.g.,
a model of adverse selection), but this would excessively complicate the analysis. Hence, I
focus on two simple polar cases, fair annuities and prohibitively costly private annuities. In
the latter case, I implicitly assume that social security has a cost advantage. This is perhaps
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Note that mortality cancels out in (7a). Also, all individual and policy
constraints depend on the length of life and on the survival rate only
through their product t 	 2t. Hence, under the assumption of perfect
annuities, survival uncertainty 	2t can be subsumed into t and does not
have to be examined separately.
Second, suppose that annuities do not exist (or are prohibitively costly).
Then those who die at the start of their retirement period must leave acci-
dental bequests. On aggregate, bequests of
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accrue either to workers (the next generation, Q1
t1) or to other retirees
(the same generation, Q2
t1).
The surviving retirees will spend their private resources Rk
t1  st at the
rate 1/t1. Including bequests and social security, retirement consump-
tion is
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Savings decisions now involve the probability of survival, 	e
2t, and they are
distorted because individuals do not value bequests. Moreover, accidental
bequests aﬀect the distribution of resources across cohorts to the extent
that they go to the young (if Q1
t  0).16
Despite this multitude of eﬀects, annuities turn out to be relatively un-
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16. If all bequests go to the old, missing annuities have only an incentive eﬀect but no




t1/(	2t1  t1)] st is the same as with annuities.important except for studying time-varying survival probabilities per se
(see sec. 6.3 below). Intuitively, savings distortions (	e
2t  1) aﬀect the
level of economic activity, but they leave the propagation of other shocks
and their eﬀect on the diﬀerent cohorts largely unchanged. And bequests
(Q1  0) give the young some exposure to shocks aﬀecting capital income,
but the eﬀect is proportional to the size of such bequests relative to wage
income, which is likely small.
Because of these complications and the fact that annuitized survival risk
is economically equivalent to length-of-life risk, I abstract from old-age
survival risk for much of the analysis and focus instead on length-of-life
uncertainty (setting 	2t  	e
2t  1). Since shocks to survival uncertainty
with fair annuities can be subsumed into t, the t shocks in this analysis
can be interpreted as reﬂecting both shocks to the length of life and “di-
versiﬁable” (through annuitization) survival uncertainty. When I explicitly
add survival uncertainty later (sec. 6.3), it will be suﬃcient to model the
case without annuities because annuitized survival uncertainty is already
covered under t.
With either assumption about annuities, the basic dynamics are similar
to the Diamond (1965) model. Each period, the young divide their wage
income (and bequests, if any) between consumption and savings. Savings
determine the next period’s capital stock, Kt1  NW
t  st, which determines
the wage rate for the next young generation. Since I am not interested in
issues of dynamic ineﬃciency, I assume that 2 	 e
2t/1(bt) is low enough
(for all 	e
2t, bt) that the economy is dynamically eﬃcient.
With all the shocks and ﬂexibly parametrized preferences, the model
does not generally have a closed-form solution. As in Bohn (1998), I there-
fore follow the real business cycle and ﬁnance literature and examine log-
linearized solutions—analytically derived ones, however, not numerically
simulated ones. To ensure balanced growth, I assume a stationary policy
rule for the replacement rate t. Without government, the model would







2t1, at) as state variables. Adding more state variables
would be uninteresting. I assume, therefore, that the policy rule is a func-
tion of at most these variables so that the model with government has the
same structure.17
Given the Markov structure, the log deviation of any variable (y)f r o m
the perfect foresight path is an approximately linear function of the log
deviations of the state variables. Unless otherwise noted, let symbols with-
out the time subscript refer to steady states and hats (ˆ) denote log devia-
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17. Without government, one could treat nW
t and t as state variables instead of their
components. The components will have diﬀerent eﬀects, however, if policy treats expected
and unexpected changes diﬀerently, e.g., in the conditionally prefunded system. Hence, I
treat the components of nW
t and t as distinct state variables throughout.tions.18 The log-linearized law of motions for any variable y can be writ-
ten as19
(9) ˆ ˆ ˆ , yk z ty k t y z t
zZ
=⋅+ ⋅ −
∈ ∑  1
where yz denotes the coeﬃcient for state variable z.T h eyz coeﬃcients
can be interpreted as elasticities of y with respect to z.
The main variables of interest are the consumption of workers and retir-
ees and the level of capital investment. Since the young divide their labor
income between consumption and savings, c1
t and kt depend on all shocks
aﬀecting the wage rate, on the incentives to save (Rk
t1), and on the payroll
tax. The consumption of the old depends on all shocks aﬀecting capital
income and social security beneﬁts (see eqq. [6a] and [6b]). The resulting
elasticity coeﬃcients for various speciﬁcations of the model are listed in
several tables discussed in the following sections.
To illustrate the practical implications of the model, I also provide the
elasticity coeﬃcients implied by a simple numerical example. For example,
assume a capital share of 1/3, full depreciation (1), payroll taxes
of 0.15, zero population growth (n  0), a steady-state productivity
growth factor of 1  a  1.35 (1 percent annual growth for a thirty-year
generational period), and an elasticity of substitution of 1/1/3. The
eﬀective retirement period—length times probability—is 	 2  1/2
(where 1/2 and 	2  1, except in sec. 6.3 below), and the time prefer-
ence 2 is set such that, in steady state, workers save 25 percent of their
disposable income.20
6.2 The Risk-Sharing Properties of Alternative Systems
This section examines the positive eﬀects of demographic shocks on the
fortunes of diﬀerent cohorts. The main sources of demographic uncer-
tainty are shocks to the workforce and shocks to the number of retirees.
For this section, I abstract from shocks that would trigger accidental be-
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18. For example, c ˆ 1
t  ln(c1
t)  ln(c1). When growth rates are involved, the “1” is sup-
pressed for notational convenience, as in n ˆ W
t  ln(1  nW
t )  ln(1  nW).
19. An intercept term could be added to reﬂect average “displacements” from the deter-
ministic paths caused, e.g., by risk aversion and precautionary savings (see Bohn 1998). But,
since the focus here is on ﬂuctuations, not level variables, intercept terms are omitted.
20. The example is motivated by the calibrated overlapping-generations model in Bohn
(1999a), which can be consulted for a discussion of calibration issues. The assumed full
depreciation is a convenient simpliﬁcation, but it implies a caveat: setting 1 reduces the
autocorrelation of capital (kk) and therefore understates the propagation of shocks. This is
acceptable here because the analysis focuses on the impact eﬀects. Setting  1 also reduces
the level of Rk, which I oﬀset by raising 2 enough that the savings rate roughly matches the
empirical investment share in GDP. This is why I calibrate savings, not the time preference.quests (setting 	2t  	e
2t  1) and assume that all variations in old-age
mortality are either changes in the known length of life or annuitized.
6.2.1 Deﬁned Beneﬁts
To start, consider an economy with constant social security beneﬁts
(DB). It will provide a benchmark for studying variable beneﬁts below.
Table 6.1 summarizes the log-linearized equilibrium responses of workers
and retirees to various shocks.
First, consider an unanticipated shock to the number of workers (n ˆ W
t 
	 ˆ 1t; panel A). A large number of workers has a clear positive eﬀect on the
old (c2	1  0) because the reduced capital-labor ratio increases the old
generation’s capital income. The eﬀect on the young is in principle ambig-
uous. With a deﬁned-beneﬁt system, members of a large cohort pay less
social security tax (). But a large workforce also reduces the wage rate,
as captured by negative  terms. The negative eﬀects dominate whenever
/(1 ). For plausible capital shares (0.3–0.4), this inequality holds
unless the tax rate is well over 20 percent. If  /(1  ), workers’ in-
come, consumption, and savings decline in response to a positive shock
to the workforce, whereas retiree consumption rises. This is also true in
the numerical example: 1/3  /(1  )  0.176; c1	1  0.131 and
k	1  0.235 are negative; and c2	1  0.436 is positive.
The main conclusion, to be reexamined below, is that, for plausible pa-
rameters, large cohorts tend to be demographically disadvantaged. Con-
versely, being in a small cohort is beneﬁcial. Even though small cohorts
face relatively high taxes under a deﬁned-beneﬁt system, they also enjoy
high wages and high returns on savings.
Second, consider shocks to the current birthrate bt (table 6.1, panel B).
If one ignores children’s expenses (setting 
  0 for this argument),
shocks to the birthrate are like shocks to the labor force that become
known one period in advance. With deﬁned beneﬁts, such shocks have no
eﬀect on the old (c2b  0). News about next period’s labor force is rele-
vant for the young, however, because they expect to be alive when the
shock actually hits the retiree-worker ratio. Looking forward, they know
that changes in bt have the same eﬀect in period t  1a st h e	1t1 shocks
discussed above. A high birthrate bt has a positive eﬀect on retired gener-
ation t workers. But, provided  /(1  ), it has a negative eﬀect on
generation t  1 workers.
The response of period t workers is most likely an increase in current
consumption and a reduction in savings. Speciﬁcally, table 6.1 shows that
the elasticities c1b and kb depend on the interaction of three eﬀects. First,
expected retirement income rises because a high future workforce reduces
next period’s capital-labor ratio and raises the return on current savings.
This income eﬀect is captured by the positive 
c2nw term in c1b and kb.
Second, the increased return triggers a substitution eﬀect in the opposite
216 Henning BohnTable 6.1 Macroeconomic Dynamics with Deﬁned Beneﬁts
Numerical
Eﬀect on: Elasticity Coeﬃcients Example
A. Shocks to the Current Workforce, 	1t and bt1
Retirees c2	1  c2b1 
 c2nw  0 .436
Workers c1	1  c1b1    c 





Investment k	1  kb1   

1   0 .235
B. Shocks to the Current Birthrate, bt
Retirees c2b  00
Workers c1b  [1   c  (c1/A)y1]  (
c2nw  Rk/
 /) .080
Investment kb    k  (c1/A)/y1  (
c2nw  Rk/
 /) .240
C. Shocks to the Current Length of Life, u
t and e
t1
Retirees c2u  c2e1  0 .769








D. Shocks to Life Expectancy (future length of life), e
t
Retirees c2e  00
Workers c1e [1   c  (c1/A)/y1] 
 c2  0 .288
Investment ke   k  (c1/A)/y1 
 c2  0 .865
E. Changes in Lagged Capital and Productivity, kt1 and at
Retirees c2k   c2a 
 c2k  0 .333
Workers c1k   c1a   c 0 .278
Investment kk   ka   k 0 .500
Notes: The eﬀect on retirees, on workers, and on investment refers to the eﬀect of the shock(s) named
in the panel head on the variables (c1/ ˆ A)t,(c2/ ˆ A)t, and k ˆ
t. Since these variables are scaled by the produc-
tivity trend At, the coeﬃcients for productivity shocks at at are negative. The eﬀects of productivity
shocks on consumption and investment levels, 1  c2a  0, 1  c1a  0, and 1  ka  0, are
nonetheless positive.
The column “Numerical Example” refers to the elasticity values in the numerical example described
in the text.
Variables without time subscripts refer to the steady state. The symbols not already deﬁned in the
text are as follows:
* 
k/an
(c2/A)  /(1 nw)
 (0, 1), share of old capital in retiree income; an  (1  a)  (1  n W);

c2k  (1  *)  *  (0, 1), eﬀect of a higher capital-labor ratio on the old;

c2nw  1 




(1  *)  (1  ) (1  )
(1  )
 (0, 1), eﬀect of a
higher current labor force on the old;

c2  1  (1  *) 
(1  )
(1  )
 (0, 1), eﬀect (absolute value) of a longer life span on the old;
Rk  (1  (1  )/Rk)  (1  )  (0, 1), eﬀect (absolute value) of a higher capital-labor ratio on the
return to capital;






 c2  k)  k/y1  0, marginal eﬀect on consumption when the in-





 c2  k)  k/y1  0, marginal eﬀect on capital investment when the
income of the young rises.direction (the Rk/ term). Finally, expenses for children increase the
consumption needs of working-age families (the 
 term with 
  0).
Unless the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high enough to oﬀset
both other eﬀects, the net eﬀects are higher consumption (c1b  0) and
lower investment (kb  0). In the numerical example, these signs apply
even for 
  0; c1b  0.08, and kb  0.24.21
Overall, a change in the birthrate triggers changes in consumption and
capital investment before it actually aﬀects the labor supply. The eﬀect
over time is traced out in ﬁgures 6.1 and 6.2. For the ﬁgures, I consider a
one-time 20 percent reduction in the birthrate bt applied to the elasticities
of the numerical example.22 In period t, retirees (generation t  1) are
unaﬀected. Workers (generation t) realize that the next working-age co-
hort will be small, which will reduce the return on savings. Assuming that
the negative income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect, generation t
will reduce their consumption c1
t and raise savings kt. In period t  1, the
lower return reduces generation t’s consumption despite the increased sav-
ings (see ﬁg. 6.1). Generation t  1’s consumption rises, in contrast, be-
cause of higher wages. Wages are higher because of the low labor supply
and because of the higher capital stock (see ﬁg. 6.2). The increased wage
outweighs the increase in tax rates. Since the capital stock rises, subse-
quent generations are better oﬀ,t o o .
Note that the increased period t savings merely magnify the change in
period t  1 wages. A reduction in bt would make the baby-bust generation
better oﬀ even if the preceding generation did not save more (say, if 1/
were large enough that kb  0). Increased savings further improve the
consumption opportunities of the baby-bust generation and its successors,
but this savings response is not crucial.23
In terms of the current policy debate, the analysis here suggests that we
are perhaps too worried about the baby-bust generation and its ability to
pay deﬁned beneﬁts to the baby boomers. Instead, the baby-bust genera-
tion can look forward to a substantial growth in wages, whereas the baby-
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21. Recall that 
  [0, ]. For the upper bound 
 3, one obtains c1b  0.455 and
kb  1.365. Unless otherwise noted, I use 
  0 for the example numbers—for simplicity
and to avoid exaggerating the birthrate eﬀects.
22. The 20 percent is somewhat less than both the projected increase in the retiree-worker
ratio from 1990 to 2020 (the baby-boom retirement) and the decline in the ratio of the age
zero to age twenty-nine population to the age thirty to age ﬁfty-nine population between
1960 and 1990 (the baby bust). The example is indicative of the shape of the impulse-
response functions in general, provided  /(1  ) and 
c2nw 
 / Rk/. One excep-
tion: for large 
, the sign of c ˆ 2
t1 and the relative magnitude of c ˆ 1
t and c ˆ 2
t1 could be reversed,
namely, if reduced expenses for children dominate the baby boomers’ behavior; but this
seems unrealistic.
23. For proof, recall the analysis of 	1t shocks, where anticipation eﬀects did not arise. This
point is worth noting because the prediction of higher savings is speciﬁc to the overlapping-
generations approach. If one assumed Ricardian bequests instead, a fertility decline would
likely trigger a slight decline in savings (see Cutler et al. 1990).boom generation may suﬀer because the small succeeding cohort reduces
the return on capital.
The overlapping-generations model produces strikingly diﬀerent results
than one would obtain in a partial equilibrium analysis (say, a trend ex-
trapolation of the type used by the Social Security Administration). This
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Fig. 6.1 Consumption responses to a birthrate shock
Note: The bars show the percentage deviations of consumption from the steady state in
response to a one-time, 20 percent reduction in the birthrate in period t, applied to the
parameter values of the numerical example with a deﬁned-beneﬁt social security system. The
responses are collected by generation, not by period. The responses under generation i 
t  2 refer, e.g., to the changes in c1
t2 (generation t  2 when young) and c2
t3 (generation
t  2 when old).
Fig. 6.2 Response of the capital-labor ratio to a birthrate shock
Note: The bars show the percentage deviations of the capital-labor ratio kt from its steady
state in response to a one-time, 20 percent reduction in the birthrate in period t, applied to
the parameter values of the numerical example with a deﬁned-beneﬁt social security system.is due to the endogenous factor prices. If one took wages and interest rates
as given, a small workforce would leave retirees unaﬀected, it would make
workers worse oﬀ because of higher taxes, and, since workers would save
less, it would make future generations worse oﬀ. If one accounts for factor-
price eﬀects, however, the partial equilibrium results are reversed. The
eﬀect of factor-price movements dominates the ﬁscal eﬀect of labor force
changes.
The latter ﬁnding relies, of course, on the general equilibrium properties
of this particular two-period overlapping-generations model. Perhaps
most signiﬁcantly, the factor-price eﬀects would be smaller if the elasticity
of factor substitution were higher, for example, with constant elasticity of
substitution technology. This and other robustness issues are examined in
section 6.5 below.24
Third, returning to table 6.1 (panel C), consider a shock to the number
of retirees,  ˆ
t  ˆ u
t. A large number of retirees directly reduces retiree
consumption because the old have to spread their capital income over a
longer period (or, in case of annuitized savings, over more people). Capital
investment and worker consumption are also reduced to the extent that an
increased retiree-worker ratio triggers higher payroll taxes. Thus, deﬁned-
beneﬁt social security helps share the risk of shocks to the length of life
across cohorts.
Fourth, consider a current shock to e
t, the expected length of life (“life
expectancy”) in period t  1. Table 6.1, panel D, shows that current life
expectancy has an eﬀect on the young, who will experience a longer life,
but no eﬀect on the old (c2e  0, as in the case of bt shocks). Looking
forward, a lagged length-of-life shock matters through its eﬀe c to nt h e
actual number of retirees (t1), like the unexpected shock u
t1.T h e
younghaveanincentivetoincreasetheirsavingsandtoreducetheircurrent
consumption (ke0,c1e 0).25This risk is not shared with the old.
Finally, consider the capital and productivity coeﬃcients in table 6.1,
panel E. Not surprisingly, a high capital-labor ratio raises capital and la-
bor incomes, hence consumption and savings. This makes kt autocorrel-
ated and propagates shocks. Productivity shocks have a negative eﬀect on
consumption and capital when scaled by productivity (c1
t/At, c2
t/At, and
kt) because a rise in At raises output less than one for one. In level terms,
however, a positive shock to at raises consumption (c1
t, c2
t) and per capita
savings kt  At.
Since a shock to productivity aﬀects the capital-labor ratio like an unex-
pected shock to the workforce, one may wonder to what extent the 	1t and
220 Henning Bohn
24. To avoid clutter, I proceed with the basic model and defer all extensions and empiri-
cal issues.
25. The overall eﬀects of increased life expectancy over time could be traced out as in ﬁg.
6.1 above, but the results would just conﬁrm the increase in savings and the reduction in per
capita consumption.at shocks have similar eﬀects. If social security is small (0), positive
shocks to at and 	1t will indeed increase retiree consumption by the same
amount (1  c2a  c2	1 for 0). They have very diﬀerent eﬀects on
current workers, however, since an increase in At raises the wage while a
rise in NW
t reduces the wage rate. For 0, at and 	1t shocks also have
diﬀerent eﬀects on retirees because they have diﬀerent distributional
eﬀects through social security.
6.2.2 Variable Beneﬁts
The analysis so far has shown that most shocks aﬀect diﬀerent genera-
tions diﬀerently or even in opposite directions. This suggests some scope
for improved risk sharing. The section examines how the allocation of risk
is modiﬁed by policies with variable social security beneﬁts.
Alternative policies are deﬁned by their elasticity coeﬃcients z, that
is, by how the replacement rate  responds to diﬀerent shocks. Table 6.2
shows how the equilibrium dynamics of consumption and capital invest-
ment are aﬀected in general by alternative z values. To help interpret the
general results, table 6.3 displays the elasticity coeﬃcients corresponding
to the four main policy alternatives—the DB, DC, privatized, and condi-
tionally prefunded social security systems—in the numerical example.26
In general, the elasticity formulas in table 6.2 include the same elements
as the corresponding formulas in table 6.1 above, but there are additional
terms that capture the eﬀects of a changing replacement rate. The policy
coeﬃcients are generally weighted by the size of government transfers rela-
tive to the cohort’s income, which is 
c2 for retirees and /(1  )f o r
workers. For workers, the eﬀect is then divided between consumption and
savings in proportions  c :  k.
Any policy that reduces prospective beneﬁts when the birthrate declines
and/or life expectancy rises is characterized by policy coeﬃcients b1 
0 and/or e1  0. A pure deﬁned-contribution system would have 	1
 b1  1 and u  e1  1. Since U.S. retirees have generally been
protected against unexpected shocks, the U.S. system seems to maintain
deﬁned beneﬁts with respect to unexpected changes (u  	1  0) but
allow beneﬁts to change after a phase-in, suggesting b1  0 and e1 
0. The tax increases and the trust fund buildup since 1983 suggest that the
U.S. system is somewhere between a DC and a DB system with respect
to anticipated changes, that is, 0  b1  1 and 0  e1  1. These
stylized facts are captured by the conditionally prefunded system (“pre-
funded” in table 6.3). For the numerical illustration of this system, I as-
sume that b1  0.5 and that e1  0.5.
In the case of shocks to the workforce, table 6.3 (panel A) shows that
deﬁned contributions and privatized systems magnify the negative expo-
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.sure of workers to such shocks, as compared to the DB case. They also
magnify the positive exposure of retirees. Table 6.2 (panel A) shows that
this is true in general, whenever 	1  0 and b1  0. In addition, b1
 0 increases workers’ instantaneous negative response to birthrate shocks
(kb  0 rises in absolute value; see table 6.2, panel B). By making the
capital-labor ratio more volatile, b1  0 also exposes future generations
to more risk. These observations reinforce the insights from table 6.1.
Large cohorts are already demographically disadvantaged at ﬁxed beneﬁts
(DB). Hence, a policy of giving them reduced beneﬁts in order to stabilize
tax rates is counterproductive.27
Table 6.3 Alternative Policies in the Numerical Example
A. Shocks to the Workforce, 	1t and bt1
Alternative Systems
DB DC Privatized
(shock to (shock to (shock to Prefunded Prefunded
	1t or 	1t or 	1t or (shock to (shock to
bt1) bt1) bt1) 	1t) bt1)
Policy coeﬃcient 0 1.0 N.A. 0 .5
Eﬀect on:
Retirees 0.436 0.667 0.667a 0.436b 0.551c
Workers 0.131 0.278 0.278a 0.131b 0.204c
Investment 0.235 0.500 0.500 0.235 0.368
















Policy coeﬃcient 0 1.0 N.A. 0 .5
Eﬀect on:
Retirees 0.769 1.0 1.0a 0.769b 0.885c
Workers 0.147 0.0 0.0a 0.147b 0.074c
Investment 0.265 0.0 0.0 0.265 0.111
Note: The notation is as in tables 6.1–6.2. For deﬁned beneﬁts (DB), deﬁned contributions
(DC), and privatized social security, 	1t and bt1 have the same eﬀects as u
t and e
t1.F o r
the conditionally prefunded system (“prefunded” above), the policy coeﬃcients are generally
in the range b1 ∈ (0, 1) and e1 ∈ (1, 0). For the numerical example, I use 0.5 and
0.5, respectively. N.A.  not applicable.
aEqual to the DC case.
bEqual to the DB case.
cIn between.
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27. This verdict may raise questions about the welfare criterion. This is addressed below.In the case of shocks to the current length of life, a system of deﬁned
contributions leaves the old more exposed and allocates less risk to the
young than a DB system: in table 6.2 (panel C), if e1  0 and/or u
 0, then c1u, c1e1, ku, and ke1 are all lower in absolute value,
whereas c2u and c2e1 are increased. With a DC system, length-of-life
risk falls entirely on the old. The policy coeﬃcient e1 also inﬂuences
how period t voters respond to news about changes in the future length of
life (e
t shocks; see table 6.2, panel D). If workers anticipate reduced fu-
ture beneﬁts, they save more (e1  0 raises ke) and consume less (e1
 0 reduces c1e).
Table 6.2 provides several additional insights. First, the government can
inﬂuence the propagation of shocks through the capital-labor ratio (kk)
by making beneﬁts a function of kt1 (setting k  0; see panel E). Sec-
ond, the government can inﬂuence the incidence of productivity shocks
by varying a.28 Third, note that, for b  e  0, only the workers bear
the risk of “bad” news about birthrates and life expectancy (see panels B
and D). By setting b, e  0, the government could spread such risks
over young and old. This is not done under any of the policies discussed
above.
Overall, table 6.3 provides a comparison of the main policy alternatives.
Under DC and private savings systems, all length-of-life risk is carried by
the old and none by the young. The DB and prefunded systems shift some
of these risks to the young. Under DC and private savings systems, birth-
rate uncertainty and other shocks to the workforce have a positive eﬀect
on the old but a negative eﬀect on the young. This negative comovement
of worker and retiree consumption is reduced by the DB and prefunded
systems, but, provided that /(1  )  , it is not eliminated.
6.3 Missing Annuities and Accidental Bequests
This section examines the ramiﬁcations of missing annuities and acci-
dental bequests. Without annuities, some shocks to old-age survival lead
to accidental bequests (	2 shocks). In addition, the existence of accidental
bequests aﬀects the propagation of the shocks examined previously.
The macroeconomic dynamics of the log-linearized model without an-
nuities are summarized in table 6.4. Recall that, in the basic model, 
shocks reduced retiree consumption while aﬀecting worker consumption
only through a change in taxes. In contrast, if savings are not annuitized,




t1) have a direct negative eﬀect
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28. Here, a  0 holds for all the main policy alternatives (the DB, DC, and conditionally
prefunded systems); i.e., their response to productivity shocks is essentially the same. One
could consider policies that respond diﬀerently (e.g., a DB system promising ﬁxed real ben-
eﬁts instead of a ﬁxed replacement rate), but productivity risk has ramiﬁcations that are
beyond the scope of this paper (see Bohn 1998, 1999a). Hence, I focus on policies with





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eon the young because of reduced bequests, while the old are aﬀected only
through changes in beneﬁts (see panel A). If beneﬁts are held constant,
the consumption of the young is further reduced because of higher taxes.
Table 6.4, panel A, also provides numerical values for the limiting case
of q  0 and a DB social security system. For q  0 and DB, survival
shocks aﬀect the worker exactly like a length-of-life shock (see table 6.1,
panel C, above). The key diﬀerence is that retirees are unaﬀected. Hence,
for dealing with 	2-type shocks, a movement toward deﬁned contributions
orprivatization looksmuchmorepromising thanitdoesfor-typeshocks.
Table 6.4, panel B, illustrates how an increase in the expected future
probability of survival (	e
2) increases workers’ incentives to save. Panels
C–G show how accidental bequests modify the other policy coeﬃcients
as compared to table 6.2 above. The modiﬁcations are proportional to the
ratio of accidental bequests to bequests plus wage income (q). If this ratio
is small, as one might expect in practice, the previous results remain virtu-
ally unchanged. For this reason, no new illustrative values are provided.
6.4 Eﬃcient Risk Sharing
If there is scope for risk sharing, what exactly should be done? This
section derives a simple eﬃciency benchmark and explores its policy im-
plications. In general, the set of eﬃcient (ex ante Pareto-optimal) alloca-
tions can be obtained by maximizing a welfare function














with welfare weights t1  0, subject to the feasibility constraints (1)–(4)
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29. The deﬁnition of eﬃciency is nontrivial because one might instead consider a welfare
function with state-contingent weights. In a model without a childhood period, Peled (1982)
has shown that the market allocation without government is Pareto eﬃcient if one interprets
generation t individuals born in diﬀerent states of nature as diﬀerent individuals and applies
state-contingent weights. With a childhood period, the market allocation is ineﬃcient even
with state-contingent weights. Moreover, Peled’s deﬁnition is too weak here because it would
rationalize any shift of risk from current to unborn generations as eﬃcient (under some
state-contingent welfare weights) and therefore make the policy analysis vacuous. Readers






2 ⋅= ⋅ ⋅
−
++



















deﬁne the eﬃcient linkages of consumption over time and across genera-
tions. Note that equation (12a) is identical to the individual optimality
condition (7a) for generation t’s savings with annuities. The fundamentally
new equation is (12b). It links period t worker and retiree consumption,
and it depends only on population growth and the welfare weights.
For risk-sharing issues, it is again useful to distinguish the economy’s
perfect-foresight path (obtained by setting all shocks to zero) from the
stochastic ﬂuctuation around this path. For the log deviations from the
perfect-foresight path, equation (12b) implies
(13) ˆˆ / ˆ . cc b tt t
12 =+ ⋅ 
 
This is a strong restriction on the comovements of worker and retiree con-
sumption: in any eﬃcient allocation, both generations’ consumption must
respond in equal proportions to all unexpected disturbances, except to
the extent that parents’ consumption needs vary with the number of chil-
dren (bt).
The key underlying assumption is CRRA utility, which assigns an equal
relative risk aversion to both generations. For utility functions with age-
dependent risk aversion, Bohn (1998) has shown that macroeconomic
risks would be shared in inverse proportion to the relative risk aversions.
The same would be true here, but age-dependent risk aversion would un-
necessarily complicate the analysis. Age-dependent risk aversion would
not, in any case, overturn the basic point that all risks should be shared
across generations.
In addition to sharing risks between living generations, government pol-
icy has the ability to reallocate risks between current and future genera-
tions by imposing history-dependent policies. This is generally necessary
to obtain a ﬁrst-best allocation, and it typically involves making policies
a function of the capital-labor ratio kt1 (see Bohn 1998). For the analysis
here, making t a function of kt1 would be a distraction. Instead, I focus
on the necessary eﬃciency condition (13) when comparing alternative so-
cial security systems. Its key implication for the elasticity coeﬃcients is
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pret the state-independent weights as an assumption of “distributional neutrality,” meaning
that we are looking for allocations in which the government does not arbitrarily value indi-
viduals born in one state of nature more highly than individuals with equal consumption
born in another state.that, for all shocks, the consumption coeﬃcients for workers and retirees
should be equal. The only exceptions are the bt coeﬃcients to the extent
that expenses for children matter.
Applied to the diﬀerent demographic shocks, the optimality condition
(13) yields a set of optimal policy coeﬃcients * z that are displayed in
table 6.5. For shocks to the actual workforce (	1t, bt1), the optimal policy
coeﬃcients * 	1 and * b1 are clearly negative for reasonable  and  val-
ues. This is true, not only for  /(1  ), but even for higher  values,
provided that
(14) 
    ++ ⋅ ⋅ > − () / * /( ). cn w c R k c q 2 1   
Since the bracketed term is positive, this strengthens the previous obser-
vation that large cohorts are worse oﬀ than small cohorts even with
PAYGO-DB. Intuitively, the bracketed term captures the eﬀect of interest
rate movements that favor small cohorts. In the numerical example, * 	1
* b1  1.5 are far below zero. Applied to the current baby-boom/bust
situation, this implies that beneﬁts should be increased as the baby-boom
Table 6.5 Optimal Policy Responses to Demographic Shocks
Policy response to changes in the current workforce:
* 	1  * b1 

c2nw   c  q  Rk   * c  [ /(1  )]

c2   * c  /(1  )
Policy response to changes in the current birthrate:





 c2  b1

c2   * c  /(1  )






c2   * c  /(1  )
Policy response to changes in the current length of life:
* u  * e1 

c2   * c  /(1  )

c2   * c  /(1  )
Policy response to changes in current retiree survival without annuities:
* 	2u  * 	2e1 
 c  [1  q  q 	 2/(1 	 2)]  /(1  )

c2   * c  /(1  )
Policy response to changes in the future length of life:





 c2  e1

c2   * c  /(1  )
Policy response to changes in future retiree survival without annuities:




 c2  	2e1

c2   * c  /(1  )
Note: The notation is as in tables 6.1–6.2 and 6.4. The asterisks denote eﬃcient values.
Social Security and Demographic Uncertainty 231cohort retires. This is contrary to most proposals in the current policy
debate.
The optimal response to a current birthrate shock (bt) is somewhat more
complicated. In the formula for * b in table 6.5, if 
c2nw  Rk/0, the
positive income eﬀect of higher future returns on capital exceeds the sub-
stitution eﬀect and tends to increase worker consumption. Eﬃciency
would call for this “windfall” to be shared with the old through higher
beneﬁts. On the other hand, if * b1 * b1  0 takes its optimal negative
value, worker income is reduced, which would call for a beneﬁt reduction.
The 
 term reﬂects the cost of children. If workers have higher expenses
for more children, a reduction in social security beneﬁts would be eﬃcient.
The sum of these eﬀects has an ambiguous sign.
In the numerical example, * b  0.212 is positive if b1  0 (e.g., with
DB), * b  0.441 is even higher if b1  1 (e.g., with DC), but * b 
0.131 takes a negative value if b1 * b1  1.5 is set optimally. Intu-
itively, the lagged policy response b1 matters because workers’ period t
decisions depend on how they expect to be treated by the government as
retirees. If a rise in the birthrate signals no change in future beneﬁts (with
DB) or increased retirement beneﬁts (with DC), workers expect to be very
well oﬀ as retirees and increase their current consumption. The optimality
condition (13) implies that the good fortune should be shared with current
retirees. A reduced birthrate—the current U.S. scenario—would then call
for an immediate beneﬁt cut. If future beneﬁts are set optimally, on the
other hand, a rise in the birthrate signals a beneﬁt cut, and workers will
reduce their consumption. Then the optimal current policy response has
the reverse sign.
In any case, eﬃciency calls for current retirees to share the eﬀect of
birthrate shocks. And, unless the baby boomers are conﬁdent that future
policy makers will follow the advice of this paper (that * b1  0) rather
than the thrust of the current social security debate (moving toward b1 
0), they are well advised to reduce current consumption and to save more.
Next, consider length-of-life shocks without eﬀect on accidental be-
quests (u
t, e
t1). Recall that, in a DB system, both generations’ consump-
tion falls in response to an increase in the length of life. The optimal policy
response therefore depends on the relative eﬀect. For reasonably small 
values, the old are more aﬀected than the young (recall table 6.1, panel C,
above). Then the beneﬁts to the old should be increased in response to
longer life expectancy, that is, * u * e1  0. In the numerical example,
* u * e1  1.647 is indeed far above zero.
Without annuities, the results are diﬀerent. With deﬁned beneﬁts, only





reduction, * 	2u * 	2e1  0, is therefore eﬃcient. Provided that 	2 and q
are small enough that 
c2  q 	 2/(1	 2) /(1), the optimal policy
is in the range 1 * 	2u * 	2e1  0, and eﬃciency therefore calls at
232 Henning Bohnmost for a partial movement to DC. In the numerical example, one ﬁnds
that * 	2u * 	2e1  0.389.
Overall, if one asks the broad question of how social security should
respond to lower mortality per se, the right answer is that it depends on
the type of shock. If the type is unknown, the large positive * coeﬃcient
for  shocks in the numerical example as compared to the small negative
coeﬃcient for 	2 shocks suggests that there is no strong case for a beneﬁt
reduction.
Finally, for shocks to current life expectancy (e
t and 	e
2t), recall that
both shocks reduce the consumption of the young without directly aﬀect-
ing the old (see table 6.1, panel D, and table 6.4, panel B). Hence, the
optimal policy response is to reduce the beneﬁts to the old, * e  0 and
* 	2e  0.30 Intuitively, increased life expectancy requires resources in the
future so that the young need to save more. For the old to share the bur-
den, current social security beneﬁts should be reduced immediately. This
conclusion applies regardless of the state of annuity markets.
In the current reform debate, many proposals call for a reduction in
beneﬁts as mortality declines, for example, by increasing the retirement
age. The analysis here suggests that the eﬃciency of such beneﬁt cuts de-
pends importantly on their timing. Cuts are eﬃcient if they are imposed
quickly (at time t, * e  0) but not if they are imposed so late that they
fall on the longer-lived cohort itself (at time t  1, * e1  0). None of
the systems discussed in the current reform debate is eﬃcient in this sense,
nor is the current policy debate moving in the direction of cutting beneﬁts
to current retirees.
6.5 Extensions and Empirical Issues
The magnitude of factor-price movements in response to demographic
shocks was a key issue in the analysis presented above. Is the model consis-
tent with the empirical evidence? Are there natural extensions of the
model that would yield diﬀerent results? To address these concerns, this
section comments on the empirical evidence and on some extensions of
the model.
6.5.1 Empirical Evidence
The most direct way to settle questions about the factor-price eﬀects of
demographic change would be to refer to empirical evidence—if convinc-
ing evidence were available. This is not the case, however. The main prob-
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30. In the numerical example, one ﬁnds * e  0.76 if e1  0 and * e  1.14 if
e1 * e1  1.647. Without annuities, * 	2e  0.057 if 	2e1  0 and * 	2e  0.146
if 	2e1 * 	2e1  0.389. The e1 and 	2e1 coeﬃcients matter because workers take the
expected future policy response to any shock to life expectancy into account when they
decide about their consumption (as explained in the case of bt shocks).lem is that, for generational issues, a single observation takes twenty to
thirty years of data. In terms of generational time units, we have only two
to three observations for the U.S. economy with social security, perhaps
four to ﬁve for countries like Germany. Even the idea of retirement—that
it is normal for nondisabled adults to stop working just because of their
age—is fairly novel. Hence, there are no time-series data of suﬃcient
length and stationarity (without serious structural breaks) to allow credi-
ble statistical inferences.31
There is, however, some indirect evidence about the eﬀect of demo-
graphic changes on wages. First, there is a large literature on cross-country
growth that suggests a negative correlation between population growth (or
fertility) and per capita income (notably Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992;
see also Cutler et al. 1990). Assuming near-constant labor shares (Cobb-
Douglas production), this suggests a negative correlation between popula-
tion growth and wages.32
Second, there is a labor economics literature examining linkages be-
tween demographics and relative wages (e.g., Welch 1979; Berger 1985;
Easterlin 1987; Murphy and Welch 1992; Macunovich 1998).33 Easterlin
(1987) and Macunovich (1998) focus almost exclusively on demographics
and argue that the eﬀects are large. Welch (1979) and Berger (1985) ﬁnd
signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of cohort size on cohort wages, although they
disagree about persistence over a worker’s career. Murphy and Welch
(1992) argue that demographic variables are only a minor determinant of
relative wages, but even they ﬁnd nontrivial cohort eﬀects.
To be conservative, I focus on Welch (1979) and Murphy and Welch
(1992). Welch’s (1979) elasticity estimates for the “persistent” eﬀect of
cohort size (narrowly deﬁned as a ﬁve-year age window) on annual wage
income are around 0.20, with some variation across education catego-
ries. Murphy and Welch’s (1992, 324) simulations imply that a 20 percent
increase in the number of young workers reduces their wages by 6–15 per-
cent, suggesting an elasticity of relative wages in the range of from 0.30
to 0.75.
For comparison, the overlapping-generations model assumes an elastic-
ity of wages with respect to the aggregate workforce of  or about
0.33, a value well within the range of elasticities given above. Moreover,
if capital owners have some ability to substitute labor across narrowly de-
ﬁned age cohorts, the elasticity of wages with respect to the aggregate
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31. Poterba (1998) makes similar arguments.
32. There is some debate about the strength of this relation (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1995; and Temple 1998). While cross-sectional evidence is attractive to circumvent the lack
of multigeneration time series, it also raises new concerns about causality and control vari-
ables. Hence, the evidence should be interpreted cautiously.
33. This literature should also be interpreted cautiously. Despite the richness of panel data,
the data provide aggregate information about only one to two generations.workforce should be at least as high as the relative-supply elasticities.
Thus, the assumptions of the overlapping-generations model are not in-
consistent with the labor economics evidence.
Finally, I should comment on the relation between demographics and
the return on capital. The recent review by Poterba (1998) ﬁnds little evi-
dence of a systematic relation. Poterba suggests that this may be due to
the small number of generational degrees of freedom. Theoretical consid-
erations suggest an additional rationalization: if old capital is a large share
of the total return (if [1  ]/Rk is near one), then the elasticity of Rk with
respect to the capital-labor ratio is small and may be diﬃcult to detect
empirically.34 Thus, the inability to ﬁnd an empirical link between demo-
graphics and stock returns is not inconsistent with the model.
6.5.2 CES Production
From a theoretical perspective, the magnitude of factor-price move-
ments depends importantly on the elasticity of factor substitution. By as-
suming Cobb-Douglas technology, the analysis presented above implicitly
assumes a unit elasticity. An elasticity of factor substitution above 1.0 will
imply smaller factor-price changes than with Cobb-Douglas and, hence, a
diﬀerent allocation of risk. To examine the importance of this issue, this
section replaces Cobb-Douglas with a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function.
For this section only, let output be produced with a CES technology,
Yt  [!  Kt
1/(1!)  (1  !)  (At  NW
t )1/(1!)]1!, where ! is the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor, and 0  !  1. Cobb-Douglas
technology is covered as the limiting case ! → 1. Leaving all other as-
sumptions unchanged (and setting 	2  1 for simplicity), the economy is
still a Markov process with unchanged state variables but with modiﬁed
dynamics.
Table 6.6 summarizes the consumption and investment dynamics with
CES production. The key diﬀerence from table 6.2 above is that the elastic-
ities of the wage and the return on capital with respect to movements in
the capital-labor ratio are scaled down by a factor !.35 In the young gener-
ation’s response to birthrate shocks,  is replaced by /!, and, in Rk,
(1  )/! replaces (1  ), where  is now the steady-state capital share.
The eﬀect of birthrate and other workforce shocks on the fortunes of
diﬀerently sized cohorts now depends on the relation between /! and
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34. For annual data, Bohn (1999a) suggests (1  )/Rk  85 percent so that Rk  0.10.
(In the numerical example, the role of  was ignored for simplicity.) The same argument
suggests that the transmission of demographics to the stock market may occur in part
through variations in the value of old capital (say, if 1 is stochastic) and not only through
the production function. This is an open question left for future research.
35. A variable factor share also complicates the calculation of the old generation’s income








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































./(1  ). Given a deﬁned-beneﬁt social security system, unexpected
shocks to the labor force are beneﬁcial to a small cohort if and only if
(15) !   // ( ) . >− 1
For elasticity values !1, this inequality is satisﬁed even more clearly
than for Cobb-Douglas. To overturn (15), one would have to argue that
the capital-labor elasticity is far above one. In the numerical example with
15 percent and 1/3, one would need an elasticity above 1.88.
The empirical production literature suggests, however, that the elasticity
is probably below rather than above one (e.g., Lucas 1969). Hence, it is
diﬃcult to question (15) on the basis of production theory.
Outside the model, one might think of international capital and labor
movements as factors that could weaken the link between U.S. factor sup-
plies and factor prices. If one interprets 1/! more broadly as parameteriz-
ing the magnitude of factor-price movements in response to demographic
change, increased openness might be interpreted as an increased ! value.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) have documented, however, that interna-
tional savings-investment linkages have historically been unimportant,
justifying a closed-economy analysis.36
Thus, concerns that the Cobb-Douglas assumption might overempha-
size factor-price movements are probably unwarranted. Based on
production-function estimates, Cobb-Douglas might even understate the
factor-price movements, which would give small cohorts an even better
starting position.
6.5.3 Elastic Labor Supply
Elastic labor supply is another consideration that could change the
eﬀect of demographics. The most serious concern is that, if small cohorts
supplied more labor, birthrate changes would have a reduced eﬀe c to nt h e
capital-labor ratio and on factor prices.
A complete model with endogenous labor supply would complicate the
analysis too much to ﬁt into this already long paper. Some results can
be obtained quite easily, however. Assume DB social security and Cobb-
Douglas technology. Then, at any level of per capita labor supply, a large
cohort will face a lower after-tax wage than a smaller cohort if and only
if the inequality  /(1  ) is satisﬁed. Thus, large cohorts face a
relatively reduced opportunity set. This shows that labor supply considera-
tions cannot overturn the basic qualitative ﬁnding that large cohorts are
demographically disadvantaged for  /(1  ).
Quantitatively, the implications of a variable labor supply depend on a
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36. Also, openness would presumably matter most if demographic change abroad were
orthogonal to that in the United States. But many other countries are undergoing demo-
graphic transitions similar to that in the United States.trade-oﬀ between income and substitution eﬀects. The negative income
eﬀect of a low wage may induce a large cohort to work more, while the
negative substitution eﬀect would encourage taking leisure. If the substitu-
tion eﬀect is weak, a variable labor supply might even magnify movements
in the eﬀective capital-labor ratio.
6.5.4 Time Aggregation
Factor-price changes and cohort welfare may also be aﬀected by time
aggregation. If one used a more elaborate model of the life cycle with
multiple working-age periods, large and small cohorts might overlap in
the labor force, leading to reduced ﬂuctuations in the labor force and in
the retiree-worker ratio. In addition, “middle-aged” workers might supply
both capital and labor, which would reduce the welfare eﬀect of factor-
price changes.37 Are such extensions likely to overturn the results ob-
tained here?
A more disaggregate approach would clearly yield diﬀerent quantitative
implications, but it is doubtful that these modiﬁcations will overturn any
important results. To see why, ﬁrst consider labor supply. Suppose one
started out with, say, cohorts deﬁned by year of birth. Then the signiﬁ-
cance of being in a small or a large birth cohort depends on the persistence
of birthrate shocks and on the substitutability of wages across birth co-
horts. If workers of diﬀerent ages are close substitutes, wage movements
are small unless the aggregate labor force varies signiﬁcantly. And, if
shocks are temporary, they would have little eﬀect on the labor force. The
baby-boom/bust phenomena suggest, however, that demographic shocks
have enough persistence to matter at generational frequencies. And the
labor literature (see above) suggests that substitution across cohorts is
not perfect.
To sidestep any controversy about relative wage eﬀects, assume for the
sake of argument that all workers are perfect substitutes.38 If small and
large cohorts overlap in the labor force, it is true that the magnitude of
wage ﬂuctuations would be less than in a crude model that abstracts from
such overlap. However, the same overlap would also reduce the ﬂuctua-
tions in the PAYGO tax rate and by the same percentage. Provided that
 /(1  ), changes in the workforce still aﬀect wages more than
taxes. Thus, an overlap of large and small cohorts in the workforce is un-
likely to aﬀect the relative importance of ﬁscal versus factor-price eﬀects.
Second, consider the issue of middle-aged workers receiving both capi-
tal and labor income. This issue is not about the size of factor-price
changes but about their welfare eﬀect. Members of a large cohort are less
worse oﬀ than in the basic model if they receive some of the high capital
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37. I thank Kevin Murphy, the discussant, for raising this issue. Murphy also raised the
issue of retirees receiving labor income, but I doubt that this is quantitatively as signiﬁcant.
38. Otherwise, even changes in narrowly deﬁned cohorts would have factor-price eﬀects.incomes generated by their own large cohort size. Note, however, that de-
mographically driven changes in the return to capital were only one of
several “transmission mechanisms” in the analysis presented above.
Smaller cohorts would be better oﬀ than large ones even if the return on
capital were held constant. To make large cohorts better oﬀ, the demo-
graphic eﬀects through the return to capital would have to outweigh the
eﬀects through the after-tax wage. Empirically, most of the gross return
on aggregate capital on an annual basis is due to the value of old capital
(see above). The “within-a-generation” elasticity of Rk with respect to the
capital-labor ratio is therefore likely small. In addition, households tend
to accumulate ﬁnancial assets fairly late in their careers (Poterba 1998).
Hence, the receipt of capital income by worker households is unlikely to
overturn the results from the basic overlapping-generations model.
6.6 Conclusions
The paper examines demographic uncertainty in a neoclassical growth
model with overlapping generations. I compare the allocation of risk im-
plied by alternative social security policies to the ex ante eﬃcient alloca-
tion. The policy answers depend signiﬁcantly on how strongly factor
prices respond to demographic change. For plausible tax rates and elastici-
ties of factor substitution, small cohorts are actually better oﬀ than large
cohorts even in a deﬁned-beneﬁt social security system. This is because
small cohorts enjoy favorable wage and interest-rate movements. Beneﬁt
cuts and/or prefunding in response to an unexpected decline in the birth-
rate would be ineﬃcient.
The eﬃcient responses to changes in life expectancy depend signiﬁ-
cantly on the type of change. If individuals know that they will live longer,
or if fair annuities are available to diversify the risk of unexpected deaths,
a longer life expectancy should trigger an increase in retirement beneﬁts
to those who live longer but a beneﬁt reduction to the previous cohort.
Reduced beneﬁts to those who expect to live longer are eﬃcient only if
increased old-age survival leads to reduced accidental bequests to the
next generation.
Overall, the eﬃciency analysis yields policy conclusions that diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly from the proposals in the current reform debate. Notably, the
eﬃcient response to a baby boom is to increase the retirement beneﬁts of
the baby boomers, even at the cost of tax increases to the baby-bust gener-
ation, and the eﬃcient response to news about increased future life expec-
tancy is to cut beneﬁts to current retirees.
With regard to birthrate shocks, I obtain conclusions that diﬀer from
the conventional wisdom because my analysis includes endogenous factor-
price movements. Factor-price eﬀects are largely ignored in the current
policy debate. The Social Security Administration, for example, makes
long-run projections of future wages and interest rates by extrapolating
Social Security and Demographic Uncertainty 239past trends. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the omission
of endogenous factor-price movements is seriously misleading under em-
pirically realistic parametric assumptions.
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Comment Kevin M. Murphy
Henning Bohn’s paper makes several important points that sometimes get
lost in the debate on the eﬀect of demographic changes on social insurance
programs (like the impending retirement of the baby-boom cohorts in the
United States). The most important of these points is that it is not the
existence of pay-as-you-go social insurance programs that makes demo-
graphic changes important or of interest to economists. Demographic
changes can have signiﬁcant eﬀects even without such programs or with-
out government programs of any kind. Neither do the eﬀects of such
changes hinge critically on market failures. Changes in demographics, like
changes in technology, represent changes in the fundamentals of the econ-
omy and as such have real eﬀects on individual outcomes, like the realized
levels of wages, interest rates, and consumption. While few would argue
with this point, it is also missed or ignored in most analyses.
Bohn also analyzes a somewhat diﬀerent aspect of risk than that ad-
dressed by many others looking at the risk of investment-based social in-
surance systems. The risk examined by Bohn is not the risk induced by
the selection of an investment portfolio (although that may be one way to
implement some of the contingent contracting that he advocates in the
paper) but the risk induced by the demographic changes themselves. He
begins by recognizing that, in a deﬁned-beneﬁt pay-as-you-go system
(where beneﬁts for those retired at date t are indexed to wages for workers
at date t), small birth cohorts face an added ﬁscal burden in that they
must pay higher social insurance tax rates to ﬁnance the beneﬁts of a
relatively larger retiree cohort. Such increases in the dependency ratio are
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the National Bureau of Economic Research.the source of much of the doom and gloom over the future of social secu-
rity in the United States and similar programs in other countries. While
Medicare suﬀers from this as well, other problems (like changes in the
consumption of medical care) add to the rising burden there. However,
this is not the whole story. While small cohorts are hurt by the social
insurance burden, small cohorts may gain for other reasons. Small cohorts
may earn higher wages as the labor-capital ratio falls during their working
years and relatively high returns on investment as they save for retirement
when capital stocks are relatively small owing to a decline in per capita
life-cycle savings. Bohn’s essential argument is that these other advantages
from being in a small birth cohort may more than outweigh the disadvan-
tages induced by a deﬁned-beneﬁt social insurance program.
I should say at this point that Bohn’s analysis is signiﬁcantly broader
than I have laid out here. He examines not only ﬂuctuations in birthrates
but also ﬂuctuations in technology and changes in both pre- and postre-
tirement life expectancy as well as the eﬀects of alternative annuity market
structures. But the essential message is similar: Before we think about how
such changes aﬀect our social insurance system, we should examine what
broader changes they induce through the market itself. I think that this is
indeed an important message.
Bohn presents his analysis using an overlapping-generations model with
three generations: children, workers, and retirees. The basic policy role
induced in the model is one of ex ante insurance (and to a lesser extent an
eﬀort to overcome ineﬃciencies in the private insurance market). The ba-
sic idea is that ex ante contracting between generations can spread the
risk of demographic and other shocks and improve expected utility for all
generations. Viewed in this way, the social insurance system represents an
opportunity for intertemporal risk sharing across generations and is not
necessarily a source of additional risk. Our goal, then, he argues, should
be to set up a system that counterbalances the risk inherent in the market
outcomes. Of course, if private individuals could engage in such trading
through trading securities or other assets that embed such risks, then such
an undertaking would not be necessary. I think that he should do more
on this dimension to convince us that such private mechanisms are not
available since that is a key aspect of his analysis.
For now, I continue to work within his framework and assume that
neither the dynastic family nor private markets can address these issues.
Under these conditions, the essential question is to determine what kind
of generation-speciﬁc risks are induced by the private market solution.
As I mentioned above, Bohn’s analysis is based on an extended two-
generation overlapping-generations model with the usual model of a
working period and a retirement period augmented by a period of child-
hood, which serves to give the economy advance warning about the size
of the coming generation of workers. This formulation serves to generate
signiﬁcant risks. First, the stark separation between workers as the suppli-
242 Henning Bohners of labor and the earners of labor income and retirees as holders of
capital and earners of capital income makes ﬂuctuations in cohort size
translate directly into ﬂuctuations in factor supplies and ﬂuctuations in
factor prices translate directly into ﬂuctuations in relative incomes. In a
world in which diﬀerences in the ownership of capital and labor were less
discrete, we would see smaller eﬀects as cohort-size changes would be
muted in terms of both how they aﬀect factor supplies and how factor
prices feed back on incomes. The incomplete nature of markets inherent
in the overlapping-generations structure also limits the ability of private
markets to achieve eﬃcient allocations of risk.
To make a long story short, under this structure, the factor-price
changes induced by birthrate and other changes more than oﬀset the
eﬀects of a social insurance system the size of the U.S. social security
and Medicare systems. This means that, from an intertemporal insurance
perspective, even with deﬁned beneﬁts small cohorts may still be better oﬀ
owing to the factor-price eﬀects. Switching to a deﬁned-contribution pay-
as-you-go system (where we cut beneﬁts rather than raise taxes as the
baby boom retires) would only make the insurance worse. I think that
this analysis adds a diﬀerent perspective than most of us have taken on
this issue.
But should we believe it? That to me is a tougher question. First, while
I follow Bohn’s analysis, I am not sure that such factor-price eﬀects are
as large as the model makes out. If we augment the model to have the
working-age population supply capital (i.e., we have more than just life-
cycle savings) or to allow for outside sources of capital or trade in labor-
intensive and capital-intensive goods, then such factor-price eﬀects of co-
hort size will be reduced. The eﬀects of changing the assumptions can be
signiﬁcant. For example, if over the working life individuals supply 1 unit
of labor and 0.5 units of capital and the reverse is true at retirement, then
the eﬀects of cohort-size changes are cut by almost 90 percent compared
to the case where the young provide 1.5 units of labor and the old provide
1.5 units of capital. This happens since both the eﬀects of cohort size on
factor supplies and the eﬀects of factor supplies on relative incomes are
cut by two-thirds. Hence, it would seem to me that that stark contrast in-
duced by the overlapping-generations structure works to make these
eﬀects large. In addition, the overlapping-generations structure limits the
ability of private markets to provide such insurance relative to a dynastic
family approach or some other framework with eﬀectively longer-lived
agents. It need not be that generations are perfectly linked through altru-
ism since I could set up contracts that lead to mutual gains to trade be-
tween my descendants and those alive today or the descendants of others
with even modest amounts of altruism.
Second, as someone who has looked at the data to try to ﬁnd the empir-
ical eﬀects of cohort size on wages, I will say that the eﬀects that I have
seen are not overwhelming. Whether they are big enough to oﬀset the
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ways tend to underestimate the degree of substitutability that will occur,
particularly for such long-run changes. Whether it is through the factor-
price equalization of trade, induced technological progress, the eﬀects de-
scribed above, or other forces, I think that the structure that Bohn lays
out is likely to overstate the actual factor-price eﬀects. As a result, I think
that we need to examine a wider class of models to see how well this result
generalizes to other market and production structures. While Bohn’s work
provides us with an important data point in this regard, I think that we
need to examine things more closely.
Finally, I would like to say that I am not sure that intertemporal insur-
ance is the most important aspect of designing a social insurance system.
The taxes used to ﬁnance such systems induce signiﬁcant excess burden,
and the beneﬁts structures signiﬁcantly distort retirement incentives. In
my opinion, these eﬀects are likely to be more important than the insur-
ance eﬀects of improved intergenerational insurance. Indeed, the convex
nature of the excess burden provides a strong rationale against raising the
tax rate in response to having a large retirement-age cohort and toward
cutting beneﬁts. It would really help in this regard if the paper provided
some estimates of the magnitude of the gains associated with the improve-
ment in insurance that could be compared to the estimates of the dead-
weight burden from taxation.
Discussion Summary
David Backus noted a caveat in the paper. The capital-labor ratio might
behave diﬀerently in open economies than in closed economies. In particu-
lar, international capital ﬂows could change some of the predictions of the
model that are driven by factor-price movements induced by the dynamics
of the capital-labor ratio.
Andrew Samwick concurred with Backus’s comment.
Stephen Ross noted that the model treats population growth as exoge-
nous. It might be important for analyzing the issues discussed in the paper
to acknowledge that population growth is endogenous. Furthermore, he
observed that Bohn does not embrace the Ricardian view but instead con-
sidered the other extreme, namely, a Rawlsian perspective where one atta-
ches substantial weight to generations to be born in the remote future.
Zvi Bodie stated ﬁrst that he liked the paper because he believes that it
frames the issues in the right way. The actual techniques used are of course
debatable. In this context, Bodie noted that, although an abstract neoclas-
sical model looking behind the veil of institutions has many advantages,
it is not useful for the study of the optimal institutional mechanism needed
244 Henning Bohnfor the implementation of the eﬃcient risk-sharing arrangement derived
by Bohn. This is nevertheless an important question, studied, for instance,
by Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick (1998). Finally, Bodie noted
that he is not convinced that the current social security system is, or is
perceived to be, a true deﬁned-beneﬁt system. It is perhaps better de-
scribed as a deﬁned-contribution plan.
James Poterba remarked that there is substantial disagreement on the
relation between population size, age structure, and factor prices. For in-
stance, larger cohorts may generate more ideas and therefore spur produc-
tivity growth more quickly according to some versions of endogenous-
growth theory. These issues are very complex and suggest at least that the
Easterlin hypothesis has many plausible alternatives. Poterba concluded
that Bohn should acknowledge these alternative hypotheses and discuss
their implications for the results obtained in the paper.
Directly related to Poterba’s comment, Robert King noted that it would
be interesting to have some—even crude—evidence about the linkages
between wages rates and population size. Economic historians have exam-
ined this, particularly with respect to immigration ﬂows at various points
in time, and have found that the eﬀects are surprisingly small. Some addi-
tional discussion that would help one evaluate the magnitude of these
eﬀects would be useful.
With respect to the previous comments, David Cutler noted that some
of the empirical evidence supports the predictions of the model. He fur-
ther noted that the paper does not consider uncertainty about productivity
while at work. In particular, there is no uncertainty about the length of
the period during which a young worker is able to work. Integrating this
into the model is an important extension. Finally, Cutler remarked that it
would be interesting to study which system is best at sharing diﬀerent
types of risks. One may want to consider hybrid systems with diﬀerent
risk-sharing rules, depending on the sort of risk to be insured.
Antonio Rangel noted that the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the pro-
duction function is crucial. In particular, it predicts perfect correlation
between wages and interest rates and might therefore be responsible for
the similarity between deﬁned-contribution and prefunded (privatized)
systems in terms of risk-sharing properties. He also remarked that the
paper allows for saving only in the form of physical capital, not in the
form of ﬁnancial assets.
Amir Yaron noted that a deﬁned-contribution system diﬀers from a pre-
funded system once one considers heterogeneity and liquidity constraints.
He also commented that the paper compares steady states and thereby
ignores what happens along transition paths. Finally, Yaron wondered
what happened to accidental bequests in the model.
Andrew Abel suggested enriching the model by allowing for labor supply
elasticity. He argued that an endogenous labor supply is important to con-
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the fact that retirees do not share in demographic risk would be tempered
by this extension. Second, the factor-price movements predicted in the
paper would also be smaller when labor is supplied elastically. Finally,
labor supply elasticity would endogenize the length of the working life
along the lines suggested by Cutler.
Richard Zeckhauser noted that, since the paper is theoretical, its results
should not depend on empirical measures. The results should instead be
presented in their most general form. With respect to possible empirical
exercises to test some of the model’s predictions, he cautioned against the
use of cross-sectional data: diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent social secu-
rity arrangements, and this might obscure the empirical analysis.
Henning Bohn responded to these comments as follows. First, with respect
to the labor supply elasticity, he noted that there would be a substitution
and an income eﬀect. It seems that this extension would preserve the main
results of the paper, at least for plausible parameter values. In particular,
he remarked that the prediction involving the condition on the sign of
/(1 ) would still obtain. The length of the working life, suggested
by Cutler, however, is another issue. This modiﬁcation of the model could
potentially change some of the results. With respect to the comments of
Backus and Samwick on the importance of the closed-economy assump-
tion for the factor-price movements derived, Bohn responded that interna-
tional capital ﬂows would not be suﬃciently strong to overturn the results,
unless the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle disappears altogether.
Bohn agreed that the Cobb-Douglas assumption was important for the
ﬁnding that deﬁned-contribution and prefunded systems have identical
risk-sharing properties. He added that a paper by Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992) shows that the Cobb-Douglas assumption is not rejected by
the data. Also, the paper considers an extension to a constant elasticity of
substitution production function and shows that, unless the elasticity of
factor substitution is above unity, the factor-price movements and other
predictions still obtain. Finally, he concluded that an empirical analysis
of the link between cohort size and factor-price movements was indeed
interesting but beyond the scope of this paper.
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